Recent advances in military-funded neurotechnology and novel opportunities for misusing neurodevices show that the problem of dual use is inherent to neuroscience. This paper discusses how the neuroscience community should respond to these dilemmas and delineates a neuroscience-specific biosecurity framework. This neurosecurity framework involves calibrated regulation, (neuro)ethical guidelines, and awareness-raising activities within the scientific community.
Introduction: Dual-Use Neurotechnology In the ethics of (bio)technology, the dualuse problem refers primarily to the cooptation of civilian technology for military aims. This expression is also used to refer to the possibility of utilizing the same technology for both beneficial (e.g., clinical) applications and harmful misuse (e.g., bioterrorism). While nearly any technology holds a potential for dual use in the broad sense, recent reports for the British Royal Society and the Dutch Research Council have provided a narrower definition and distinguished ''intentional misuse'' from the general domain of repurposing activities with unintended harmful consequences. Dualuse technologies are originally designed and developed for a wide spectrum of civilian purposes, among which biomedical research and healthcare often play a prominent role.
Until recent times most attention to dual-use technology emerged in the fields of molecular and cell biology, especially in those areas involving research on pathogens such as virology, bacteriology, and other subdivisions of microbiology. Security-sensitive research in these fields of science is classified as Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC). DURC is a United States government's oversight label identifying research in the life sciences that can be anticipated to provide informational or technical resources for the development of threats to public health, individual safety, or national security. The DURC label was introduced to prevent the malicious application of life science research, and although this framing has recently faced criticism among researchers (e.g., for not clearly demarcating the range of dual-use applications and providing only limited oversight), it is still in place as a guidance mechanism among national and international organizations.
In the past two decades, new concerns have been raised as several emerging neurotechnologies have shown dual-use potential, causing the inclusion of various areas of neuroscience into the DURC domain. Tennison and Moreno (2012) have extensively reviewed the domain of neurotechnology tools with applications in both civilian and national security contexts with special focus on projects funded via the Pentagon's Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). Their state-of-the-art review identified three main categories of dualuse neurotechnology: brain-computer interfaces (BCIs), neurotechnologies for warfighter enhancement, and neurotechnological systems for deception detection and interrogation (Tennison and Moreno, 2012) . The first category encompasses systems that establish a direct connection channel between the human brain and an external computer device, bypassing the peripheral nervous and muscular system. Medical applications of BCI have shown clinical effectiveness in repairing, assisting, or augmenting cognitive or sensory-motor functions in patients experiencing neurological impairments including spinal-cord injury, stroke, motor neuron disease, and, more recently, even though with significant limitations, age-related cognitive decline and Alzheimer's disease (AD). Outside the clinics, non-invasive directto-consumer BCIs are gaining increasing popularity as portable (often smartphone-compatible) tools for device control, self-neuromonitoring, and personalized entertainment.
Using the same technological paradigm, national security uses of BCI include the acquisition of neural information gathered from warfighters' brains to adaptively modify their equipment and the development of Threat Warning Systems that convert subconscious, neurological responses to danger into consciously available information (Miranda et al., 2015) . Warfighter enhancement applications include pharmacological and non-pharmacological (especially transcranial direct current stimulation [tDCS]) technologies for selective cognitive enhancement in targeted brain areas. Finally, the deception detection domain encompasses devices such as the so-called ''brain-fingerprints'' capable of accessing concealed information in response to a stimulus.
While these applications, especially those based on functional magnetic resonance (fMRI) and electroencephalography (EEG), hold a great potential for medical diagnostics, they are powerful surveillance and enhancement tools for national security, judicial, and military purposes due to their dual-use character. Although no deception detection technology is being currently used in official security operations, several devices are either directly DARPA commissioned or are able to market their services to national security and law enforcement agencies (http://www. truthfulbrain.com/martkets/).
The dual-use problem is often presented as an ethical dilemma since it identifies a conflict between two fundamental ethical duties: the promotion of good and the prevention of possible collateral harm, e.g., between the promotion of health through effective clinical applications and the provision of resources for the killing of civilians through military operations. Marchant and Gullant have noted that, in some research contexts, including neurotechnology, the complexity of the dual-use dilemma is increased by its bidirectional character. While classical dualuse problems are concerned with the cooptation of beneficial, civilian technology for military or nefarious purposes, neurotechnology also raises the reverse problem as several neurotechnologies developed by the military for national security purposes are likely to spill over into the civilian sector with a disruptive impact on healthcare, communication, or other fields (Marchant and Gulley, 2010) .
The dual-use character of neurotechnology makes it also a potential target for non-State actors. In fact, as many neurotechnologies are based on computation and information processing, they are potentially vulnerable to cyber risks. Even though there are no confirmed cases of malicious attacks in non-experimental settings, information security researchers have experimentally demonstrated the actual feasibility of performing side-channel attacks and extracting private information from users of EEG-based BCIs without their authorization (Lange et al., 2017) . These experiments have shown that neurotechnology is subject to similar privacy vulnerabilities and cyber risks as other computer systems. In response to that, neuroengineers have called for enhancing the security of current neurodevices and incorporating protective measures such as encryption technology into the product design (Bonaci et al., 2015) .
The Bidirectional Character of Dual Use in Neurotechnology
As dual use appears inherent to neurotechnology, the progressive increase in the number of civilian-both clinical and consumer-grade-neurotechnology applications will likely determine a proportionate increase in dual-use opportunities.
With global population aging, an important portion of neurotechnological applications is being developed with the purpose of assisting or providing novel therapeutic, diagnostic, and assistive solutions for older adults with cognitive or physical disabilities. Researchers have observed that the number of technology applications for older adults and people with dementia is nearly tripling every 5 years . In parallel, a growing number of portable diagnostic tools are under development. For example, virtual reality techniques and mobile apps (http://www. seaheroquest.com/site/en/) can be used to detect navigational deficits in cognitive aging and AD.
Many technologies currently used for seniors and the cognitively disabled have a dual-use potential. Notably, nearinfrared spectroscopy (NIRS) is used in medical and physiological diagnostics to assess loss of functional hemispheric asymmetry or verbal fluency in AD, as well as to comparatively measure cognitive function in, respectively, normal cognitive aging and prodromal dementia. Similarly, transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) techniques can help enucleating the neurophysiological profile of vascular dementia and understanding the role of different neurotransmission pathways. Today, DARPA-funded NIRS applications are being tested for military purposes to detect deficiencies in a warfighter's neural processes and feed that information into a device utilizing in-helmet or in-vehicle transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) to suppress or enhance individual brain functions (Tennison and Moreno, 2012) .
Vice versa, given the bidirectional character of dual-use in neurotechnology, several applications have shown reverse dual-use potential. A paradigmatic example is the DARPA-funded Restorative Encoding Memory Integration Neural Device (REMIND) (http://ieeexplore.ieee. org/document/6090905) program. Under this program, researchers were able to detect patterns of functional brain connectivity in the hippocampus and prefrontal cortex associated with successful memory encoding and retrieval. After identifying hippocampal firing patterns associated with correct encoding of a specific event, they translated these outputs into electrical stimulation in animal models with rodents. Their results show that, when applied to the hippocampus during memory encoding, the stimulation significantly improved the ability of rodents to subsequently remember an event (Hampson et al., 2012) . These promising results, obtained in the context of military-oriented neuroengineering research, hold the potential of leaking into the civilian sector with beneficial impacts. With recent unmet expectations in pharmacological research on memory restoration, neurostimulation studies could complement or even create new avenues of therapeutic research for memory disorders such as AD and other dementias, post-traumatic amnesia, and even normal aging.
In some circumstances, dual-use in neurotechnology can generate a circular dynamic. As mentioned previously, several non-invasive, direct-to-consumer BCIs have made their way onto the consumer market. However, as Miranda et al. (2015) observed, ''the signal-tonoise ratio of these systems is often too low to reliably detect many EEG components of interest for neuroscience efforts aimed at improving human training and performance, particularly when single trial analysis is required'' (Miranda et al., 2015) . DARPA-funded programs such as the CT2WS (https://www.forbes.com/ sites/katiedrummond/2012/09/18/darpathreat-recognition/#6ef840d12728) aim precisely at developing reliable EEGbased BCIs for applications such as threat detection and non-invasively recording of operators' neural activity (Miranda et al., 2015) . These efforts are an example of a civilian technology that is coopted for military research and may subsequently spillover into the civilian sector through more reliable clinical or commercial applications (Figure 1) .
A Global Ban on Dual-Use Neurotechnology? From Applied Ethics to Policy
The problem of dual use in neurotechnology is exacerbated by the fact that national security and military applications are not the only way to repurpose civilian neurotechnologies. As mentioned before, misuse by malevolent individuals or groups is likely to become a concrete risk in the near future. Proliferation of both civilian and military neurotechnology is increasing the chances that neurodevices could land in the wrong hands. As neuroethicist James Giordano put it, ''It's not a question of if nonState actors will use some form of neuroscientific techniques or technologies, but when, and which ones they'll use'' (Requarth, 2015) . Malevolent uses of neurotechnology could be potentially performed not only by individual actors, but also in the context of organized criminality, terrorist organizations, and other State and non-State actors, hence raising global security concerns.
The emerging risks associated with dual-use issues in neurotechnology have led scholars to take a critical stance against national defense and security involvement in neuroscience research. For example, it was argued that ''[m]ost rational human beings would believe that if we could have a world where nobody does military neuroscience, we'll all be better off'' (Cressey, 2008) . These evaluations have led policy makers to consider the possibility of introducing a moratorium against military neuroscience. For example, in 1999 the European Parliament Committee on Foreign Affairs, Security and Defense Policy (rapporteur: Maj Britt Theorin) called for a global ban of research ''which seeks to apply knowledge of the chemical, electrical, (.) or other functioning of the human brain to the development of weapons which might enable any form of manipulation of human beings'' (http://www.envirosecurity.org/ ges/TheorinReport14Jan1999.pdf). However, given the reverse dual-use potential of neurotechnology, the claim that we would be better off in a world without military neurotechnology is likely to be an inaccurate prediction. Defense-funded research enables increased funding opportunities for accelerating development in neurotechnology and can spillover into civilian applications for the benefit of society. It cannot be ruled out a priori that military neurotechnology could follow a similar historical trajectory as geographic positioning system (GPS) surveillance and the Internet-examples of originally military-oriented technologies that eventually leaked into the civilian sector and today ''pervade society's daily life, mostly with beneficial impacts'' (Marchant and Gulley, 2010) . Risks of misuse are common to nearly all ICTs, including those that are regularly used in daily activities such as mobile computing and social media. The long-term effects of these technologies might be hard to predict. In addition, these systems can be realistically repurposed for malicious activities including cyberwarfare and cyberterrorism. Nonetheless, a global ban on these technologies would likely be perceived by many as a disproportionate policy response as their foreseeable benefits outweigh the conceivable harms. A global ban on military neurotechnology would prevent any spillover effect into civilian applications and could delay technological innovation for people in need including older people and patients with neurological disorders.
In light of population aging, the global burden of neurological disorders and the bidirectional dynamics of dual-use issues in neurotechnology, we identify a strategic and global health benefit in continuing research in defense-funded neurotechnology to successfully meet the grand challenges ahead in mental health and neurological care.
The Need for a Neurosecurity Framework Although a global ban or moratorium on military neurotechnology appears ethically unjustified at present, softer and more calibrated regulatory interventions might be necessary to mitigate the risks of a disproportionate weaponization of neuroscience. In particular, we identify an urgent need for increased monitoring and careful risk assessment in the context of dualuse neurotechnology. Even though, at the moment, benefits seem to outweigh the risks, preventive mechanisms should be in place to promptly detect future variations in the risk-benefit ratio. Building upon the experience of biosecurity frameworks developed in other areas of the life sciences might be a viable strategy to tackle the emerging problem of dual use in neurotechnology. However, adaptive adjustments to the specific challenges of neuroscience and neurotechnology are required. The reason for that stems from the fact that the misuse of neurotechnology might have a more direct impact on the mental dimension of individuals and hence pose specific ethical, legal, and social challenges. As neurodevices have the capacity to access and modify the neural correlates of mental processes, their misuse by malevolent actors could expose individuals to greater risks associated to their mental dimension.
To this purpose, we identify a need for developing a neuro-specific biosecurity Following biosecurity strategies in cell biology and other life sciences, such neurosecurity framework should be designed and implemented to maximize security across the whole translational continuum between scientific research and society (and reverse). Furthermore, it should be particularly sensitized to anticipate and promptly detect neurotechnology-specific threats, especially those that concern the mental dimension. This neurosecurity framework should include, at least, three main levels of safeguard: calibrated regulatory interventions, codes of ethical conduct, and awareness-raising activities. In the following, we provide a nonexhaustive characterization of these requirements.
First of all, calibrated and neuro-specific regulatory approaches are needed to ensure neurosecurity for individuals and groups. Currently, military neurotechnology falls into a regulatory chasm. The two existing U.N. treaties-the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) and Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)-that de iure should limit abuses within the neurotechnology domain, only focus on biological and chemical bioweapons but contain no provisions for electrophysiological applications (Schmid, 2014) . Additionally, the CWC does not prohibit the use of chemical weapons in riot control, leaving open the possibility that riot control tools might be coopted as neurochemical weapons for offense. These regulatory gaps and loopholes could allow opportunities for misuse and offense, especially in war zones. Experts have already emphasized the limited scope of the CWC and called for their urgent update, warning the treaty's exclusive focus on national authorities and neglect of individuals, revolutionary groups, factions in civil wars, and terrorist cells that can exert a detrimental influence on global security (Sydnes, 2013) . Such expansion of the weapons conventions should also aim at preventing detrimental misuses of neuroelectric applications. Legal scholars have argued that certain neuroweapons might be incompatible with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as they ''ultimately disrupt the premise of responsibility under IHL'' (Noll, 2014) . Consequently, national governments and international organizations are under obligation to consider how neuroweapons would relate to IHL norms. Similarly, it should be considered how dual-use neurotechnology relates to human rights such as autonomy, privacy, and mental or physical integrity.
In the context of nefarious misuse by State and non-State actors, emerging collateral risks associated with the widespread use of neurotechnology such as malicious hacking, neuroimaging-based intelligence interrogation, as well as hazardous uses of medical neuromodulation, are likely to require neurospecific security safeguards. Adequate regulatory responses by governmental and intergovernmental organizations might require the evolutive interpretation of existing rights (e.g., updating privacy rights to account for mental privacy) or even the creation of new neurospecific rights (Ienca and Andorno, 2017) . A possible candidate is the protection of mental integrity. Although mental integrity is protected by the EU's Charter of fundamental rights (Article 3), this right is conceptualized as a guarantee for accessible mental health services. No specific protection, however, is stipulated against unauthorized intrusions into a person's neural computation through the use of neurotechnology, even if such intrusions result in physical or mental harm to the victim. Other possible candidates include the right to psychological continuity, which intends to protect the continuity of personal identity from unconsented exogenous alteration (Ienca and Andorno, 2017) . These regulatory updates could be operationalized within the general schemes set by existing declarations such as the Universal Declaration on Bioethics and Human Rights adopted by UNESCO, but with specific focus on the challenges raised by neurotechnology-similarly to how the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights or the International Declaration on Human Genetic Data addressed specific normative issues raised by genetic testing and engineering.
Second, codes of ethical conduct need to be developed to maximize the benefits of military neuroscience while minimizing the risks for individuals and communities. If research on selective memory manipulation (restoration or erasure) will ever reach human experimentation, it must guarantee the highest safety and research ethics standards. In particular, clinical trials must (1) be preceded by corroborated evidence of safety and effectiveness in animal, in vitro, and computational models, (2) prioritize subjects with treatment-resistant conditions, whose symptoms elude conventional therapies, (3) demonstrably exclude unintended collateral consequences on non-targeted brain functions, and (4) follow rigorous procedures for the obtainment of informed consent and IRB approval. Furthermore, to protect the autonomy of users, military neurotechnology applications, including those that leak into the civilian domain, should be non-coercive. Soldiers and civilians should keep their right to cognitive liberty, i.e., the right to competently choose or refuse to use neurodevices. In the context of military applications, it should be determined whether defense bodies and armed forces can legitimately require combatants to use brain-altering or brain-reading neurodevices as part of the Uniform Code of Military Justice, which requires soldiers ''to accept medical interventions that make them fit for duty'' (Tennison and Moreno, 2012) . This question is particularly sensitive since the principle of cognitive liberty protects not only from explicitly coercive uses but also from ''implicit coercion,'' namely when an individual is not directly forced to use a technology by formal coercive rules but is compelled to conform to a social equilibrium in which not using that technology creates a significant disadvantage. At the same time, in order to fulfill the need for responsible innovation in neurotechnology, data security measures should become a critical component of neurotechnology design and development. To this purpose, regulations should incentivize manufacturers to equip neurotechnologies with encryption, especially those technologies that can record and/ or manipulate privacy-sensitive aspects of neural processing.
Finally, a neurosecurity framework should raise awareness among neuroscientists, neuroengineers, and clinicians about dual use. In fact, although several neurotechnology applications, including applications in geriatric neurology and psychiatry, have demonstrated dual-use potential, awareness of dual use is reportedly low among researchers. As Tennison and Moreno have observed, although ''they may receive funding from national security agencies, neuroscientists may not consider how their work contributes to warfare'' (Tennison and Moreno, 2012) . This consideration is consistent with the observation that the two-volume, 200-page report on the ethical implications of the BRAIN Initiative does not include the terms ''dual use'' or ''weaponization'' (Requarth, 2015) , in spite of the fact that the initiative receives significant funding from DARPA for defense and military applications. Further research, especially in the form of survey questionnaires and interviews, is required to monitor and accurately assess the level of awareness of dual-use issues in neurotechnology among researchers and clinicians. Concurrently, potential conflicts of interest linked to military funding should become a deontological concern also among neuroscientists and must be systematically disclosed at the level of research funding, IRB approval, and scientific publication. In parallel, public engagement strategies such as citizen science initiatives, hackathons, and open-development platforms like Open BCI (http://openbci.com/) must be sustained and incentivized.
A first promising step in the direction of awareness-enhancing strategies is the recent participation of representatives of the European Commission flagship initiative Human Brain Project (HBP) in a webinar (http://www.tekno.dk/article/dualuse-and-neuroscience-invitation-to-anonline-debate/?lang=en) on ''dual-use and neuroscience. HBP researchers recognized that ''a significant proportion of modern neuroscience research (not the research conducted by the HBP partners) receives funding from sources associated with the military'' and hence requires ethical and policy assessment.
Another positive example is a pledge drafted in 2010 and signed by neuroscientists in 17 different countries. The pledge was designed ''as a course of action'' for neuroscientists who share dual-use concerns. Their signers commit to two programmatic obligations:
(1) ''Making themselves aware of the potential applications of their work and that of others to applications that violate basic human rights or international law such as torture and aggressive war.'' (2) ''Refusing to participate knowingly in the application of neuroscience to violations of basic human rights and international law'' (Bell, 2014) .
In addition, the pledge emphasizes the importance of raising awareness in the neuroscience community ''through education and discussion,'' for example, by introducing neuroethics courses into neuroscience curricula, as well as through the creation of appropriate regulatory bodies such as ''committees or working groups'' that might provide guidance or advise to neuroscience projects with identifiable dual-use potential (Bell, 2014) . In February 2012, a committee of the British Royal Society issued a report on ''Neuroscience, Conflict & Security.'' The main tenet of the report was that ''neuroscientists have a responsibility to be aware from an early stage of their training that knowledge and technologies used for beneficial purposes can also be misused for harmful purposes'' (Flower et al., 2012) . Additionally, the report included ten specific recommendations for oversight of neurotechnology applications to military and law enforcement agencies. While the British example is encouraging, more needs to be done to expand this paradigm to other countries and to better root it in the neuroscience community, especially among ''neuroscientists at an early stage of their training'' (Flower et al., 2012) .
The International Neuroethics Society (INS) (http://www.neuroethicssociety.org/) can play a key role in raising awareness and promoting responsible innovation in an international context. The mission of the INS is precisely to ''encourage and inspire research and dialogue on the responsible use of advances in brain science.'' Conclusion Dual-use dilemmas are inherent to neuroscience. Building upon the experience of biosecurity frameworks developed in other areas, the life sciences might be a viable strategy to tackle the emerging problem of dual-use neurotechnology. However, adaptive adjustments to the specific challenges of neuroscience and neurotechnology are required. While a global ban of neurotechnology appears ethically unjustified, dual-use trends in this domain require increased monitoring, careful risk-assessment, and evidencebased normative interventions. A neurosecurity framework could help anticipate future threats and maximize security in the neurotechnology domain through calibrated regulatory interventions, (neuro) ethical codes of conduct, and awareness-raising activities across the scientific community and the public.
